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Milo evit and Hussein on Trial
Alfred P. Rubint
Saddam Hussein is the easier case, so we will discuss it first.
Now that he has been captured by Coalition (American?) forces, the
question is what to do with him. The obvious answer is to try him for
something. But who should try him and for what? The answer most often
given is that an international tribunal should try Hussein in The Hague for
various crimes, just as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is trying Slobodan Milogevit. That approach, however,
presents numerous difficulties. I shall mention only four. First: A special
tribunal is trying Milo~evit, a tribunal to which he, as President of Serbia,
agreed.1 No such tribunal currently exists with regard to Iraq.
t Emeritus Distinguished Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
1. Article IX of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (GFA) provides that the Parties (including the Republika Srpska), "shall cooperate
fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement ... pursuant to
the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law." General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996)
[hereinafter GFA]. Whether a court in The Hague is an appropriate tribunal, whether
any acts of Milo~evit violate international humanitarian law etc. are not at all clear. See
id. Annex 6. Apparently, the participants at the conference that drafted these articles
conceived of international human rights as including all the rights listed in Chapter I to
this Annex, although they are not defined; e.g., the right to life has no exception for
judicial sentencing; the right not to be subjected to torture does not define torture, etc.
The summary by Paul C. Szasz, says that the GFA "is an extremely complex instrument,
and is the center-piece of an even more complicated and extensive set of arrangements
.... Paul Szasz, Introduction to General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 35 I.L.M. 75, 77 (1996). The so-called Dayton Accords appear at p.
170-187 of the same International Legal Materials (ILM). Szasz writes that Slobodan
Miloevi headed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Delegation, but I did not find
his signature on any of the documents except a note addressed to the Acting Secretary-
General of NATO "wish[ing] to assure you that the FRY shall take all necessary steps,
consistent with the sovereignty, territorial inte[g]rity and political independence of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the Republika Srpska fully respects and complies
with commitments to NATO..." Id. at 107. Another note addressed to Alija Izetbegovi
as President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina stating the "intention" of the
Republika Srpska and the FRY to see "established passenger and freight rail service on a
regular schedule" along various established rail lines, and identical notes to the UK,
French, Russian, German, and American delegation leaders saying that "Dr. Nikola
Kolijevit is authorized to sign the Annexes for the Republika Srpska." Id. at 163-66.
Several of the GFA documents are signed by Milan Milutinovit as Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the FRY and it is difficult to believe that he did not have an equivalent author-
ity. In a concluding statement issued at Dayton by President Izetbegovit (for the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), President Zubak (for the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), President Tudjman (for Croatia) and President Milogevil (on behalf of the
FRY and the Republika Srpska) it is said that they initialed the GFA and its annexes
"signifying their consent to be bound thereby." Id. at 169. The U.N. Security Council
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Second: What is the reason for the criminal trial, indeed, for the crimi-
nal law generally? Is it retribution: "An eye for an eye?" Deterrence of the
actor: What are the chances the Iraqis will elect or select Hussein for a
leadership position again? Deterrence of others: Like who? George W.
Bush? Vladimir Putin? Fidel Castro? The Chinese leaders? What are the
chances that any of them will be deterred by a trial of Hussein? To stake
out a moral leadership position for the captors: Moral as judged by whom?
Is our perception of what is moral binding on Iraqis; is theirs binding on
us? Closure for the villain's victims: Are they informed of the capture?
What of the villain's supporters? This seems to be the most significant of
the reasons for Hussein's trial, but is it sufficient? To avoid reciprocal
atrocities: Is there any evidence that Hussein's supporters plan them or will
be deterred by the trial of Hussein? I would have expected an attitude of
reciprocity more than one of deterrence and an acknowledgment that our
view of Hussein and Milogevit is the superior one.
Assuming that there is a reason for the trial, nobody trusts an Iraqi
court in Iraq to come to a decision based on the justice of the case alone.
Of course, the concepts of justice, fairness, and equity vary with the
judge(s); what is just to one is unjust to another. We can be certain, how-
ever, that justice in an Iraqi court will be seen by many as unjust, unfair or
inequitable no matter what the result.
The same considerations apply to Milogevit. Would any Serbian with-
out a hidden agenda trust a Serbian court to come to a fair, equitable, or
just decision regarding Milogevit? It may be that Americans and Europe-
ans would regard an Iraqi tribunal, with a judge or judges appointed or
approved by us to be fair, but the real question is would Iraqis regard such
a tribunal as fair? Are the American aims in trying Hussein consistent with
American aims in installing a democracy in Iraq? Is a democracy incapa-
ble of electing villains to be their leaders?
Third: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague does not
have jurisdiction to try anybody for any crimes; its jurisdiction is limited to
disputes among states, and for that matter, only those states that are par-
ties to the creating statute of the court, who do not have pertinent reserva-
tions and who have submitted themselves to its authority with regard to the
type of cases presented. The United States, since losing a case before the
court involving Nicaragua in 1986,2 has amended its own submission to
the ICJ to cover only some cases, none of which appear to have been vio-
also passed two resolutions dealing with the FRY, id. at 188-92, but neither seems perti-
nent to this discussion. Milogevi4 might also be mentioned elsewhere (e.g., in the side-
letter signed by Mom~ilo Krajignik and Nikola Koljevit and Aleksa Buha for the FRY,
reproduced at id. at 153). It seems clear only that Milogevit's signature was intended to
bind the Republika Srpska and the FRY, but not himself personally. The punishment for
the parties bound by international law would seem to be subject to negotiation and the
whim of the other parties to the various documents.
2. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 Uune 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus-ijudgment/inus-ijudgment_19
860627.pdf.
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lated by Hussein's Iraq.3
Fourth: the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, set up
in 2000 by the Treaty of Rome, does not apply to events prior to its coming
into force in 2002.4 Thus, not only are its judges regarded as unfair,
unjust, or inequitable by many (including many Americans as evidenced
by the fact that the United States is not a party to the statute of the court),
it cannot apply any law to most of Saddam Hussein's tenure in Iraq, includ-
ing his bloodiest killings. Moreover, the treaty setting up the Tribunal per-
mits each state party to handle any case by itself, and refers the accused to
the Tribunal only when the state with normal jurisdiction to prescribe, to
adjudicate, or to enforce fails.5 Whether the court system of any particular
state has failed is a matter left to the judges of the ICC,6 and the selection
of those judges is a.highly political matter. 7 The court system of Iraq might
fail in the opinion of many, but that is not yet the case.
Another possibility is to set up a special 'tribunal in The Hague to
apply some law to Saddam Hussein. Submission to that tribunal, however,
would have to be an act of the government of Iraq. And who is that govern-
ment at this moment? The United States? The politically appointed Iraqi
Governing Council, composed of people selected for other reasons by the
United States? The government elected a few weeks ago by what we regard
as the population of Iraq? Would anybody believe that their decisions with
regard to Hussein would be free from political manipulation? The same
problems would exist with regard to a tribunal in any state, including one
in the United States, and were even behind the convening of the tribunal
that tried the major Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg, Germany, and not in
any allied victor state of the Second World War.
It is, of course, possible to find a state willing to be the seat of such a
trial; Belgium, which has enacted a universal jurisdiction to adjudicate stat-
3. The United States of America is not currently bound by any general declaration
recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See Declarations Recognizing as Com-
pulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, 56 ICJ YEARBOOK 117 (2002). The United States of
America had been so bound. Id. at 117 n.1. There are many bilateral and multilateral
agreements to which the United States of America is a party, under which questions of
interpretation are referred to the ICJ. See id. at 162-81 for a full list of treaties (includ-
ing many of which the United States of America is not a party).
4. The history of the court is very complex. The Statute was essentially negotiated
in 1998, reached its current form in the year 2000, and entered into force in 2002. See
Alain Pellet, Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 145 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)
for a discussion of the process behind the adoption of the Statute.
5. The Statute of the ICC was completed on 17 July 1998, but provides that it
would not enter into force until sixty days after the deposit of the sixtieth instrument of
ratification. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
The ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to "crimes committed after the entry into
force of this Statute." Id. art. 11. I am indebted to Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni for a
copy of the Treaty.
6. Id. arts. 17-19.
7. Id. art. 36. The selection procedure is extremely complex, as the framers of the
Rome Statute sought to reduce the impact of politics on the selection of judges. It seems
to me that they were unsuccessful.
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ute, comes to mind. But Belgium has limited the scope of its own statute
under the pressure of reality, and such doubts over jurisdiction and appli-
cable law must arise that a conviction by such a tribunal, although satisfy-
ing to some, must be very unsatisfying to many others. Iran is another
possibility, if Saddam can be accused of violating Iranian or international
law in Iran. But it appears that he cannot be effectively accused of any
such acts. The Kurds are, of course, Iraqis themselves, and violations of the
international laws of war lead to national sanctions by the forces involved
in the violations, which, in the case of Saddam Hussein, would seem to be
Iraq, not Iran. Additionally, "war crimes" against Iranians depend upon
the definition of "war crimes"; the Geneva Conventions are not helpful
there. 8
That leaves only Iraq. But what Iraqi law has Saddam Hussein vio-
lated? That is a major question. Iraqi law does not seem to have been
violated by Saddam Hussein, although it is entirely possible that some
Iraqi law-maker will develop a theory under which some Iraqi criminal law
would appear to have been violated by Saddam Hussein's horrible acts.
Some would reply that he violated international law; a law that is argued to
forbid genocide and other killings in his own country. But whether there is
such a law is really an open question. 9
At Nuremberg, the Communists were not tried for various atrocities
committed against their own and other nationals. Fidel Castro is not being
tried today, nor are others who may be accused of violating various aspects
of what is argued to be applicable international criminal law (assuming
there is such a thing). Indeed, the British sent Napoleon into exile in Elba
(from which he escaped) and St. Helena (where he was probably poisoned
by the British) rather than try him for anything, and his successor regime
in France was not even given that option. Indeed, it is more than doubtful
that Saddam Hussein has violated any international law by killing his Iraqi
opponents in Iraq, no matter what they or others may say. Thus, experi-
ence indicates that there is no violation of an hypothesized but probably
non-existent international criminal law of universal application, but that
politically it might be wise to exile him or otherwise get rid of him without
asking too many embarrassing questions.
That seems to have been what was done in the case of the genocide in
Rwanda, the Milogevit situation in the former Yugoslavia, and in many
8. See Alfred P. Rubin, Is International Criminal Law "Universal"?, 2001 UNIVERITnY
OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 351, 360-61 (2001) for a discussion of many other Conven-
tions, including the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TRATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. All prescribe a tribunal in the territory
in which the offense allegedly occurred, in this case Iraq. The punishment for violation
of this provision is not a separate criminal trial of the villain(s) concerned, but a loss of
the reputation of the state involved which has breached its word.
9. The various treaties usually cited as creating an international criminal law do no
such thing. See generally Rubin, supra note 8 (expressing skepticism regarding the effec-
tiveness of international law).
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other instances. The proponents of international criminal law have cited
these examples as precedents for a general international law by which indi-
viduals are held criminally liable for various acts. But the cases seem to be
based on either a special treaty or the dominance of a victor who presumes
to dictate rules to the vanquished that do not apply to its own activities.
That leaves us with the gap in coverage which has always existed and might
well continue to exist, although nobody, at least it seems no American or
European, doubts the villainy of Saddam Hussein. The best way of han-
dling that problem with the least hypocrisy seems to be to hand Saddam
over to an Iraqi tribunal which will deal with him as it sees fit, bending
Iraqi law and applying either its version of that law or its version of an
international law which can (and surely will) be denied by those who look
closely at the situation.
One should remember that there are lawyers on both sides of many (if
not all) cases and those on the other side are as convinced of the righteous-
ness of their position as those on our side. Who is to say that they are
wrong? Whose opinion is truly objective or reflects eternal verities? Those
who happen to agree with us at this time? Who are we to say so?
As to Milo~evie, the case is not much clearer. The so-called Dayton
Accords 10 feature only the three parts of the former Yugoslavia (the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the FRY, com-
prising the Serb-dominated areas plus Kosovo) as signatories. This means
that only they have the legal power to interpret the Accords, and any viola-
tions might be the subject of diplomatic or other action by them, but not by
the witnesses." Moreover, the United Nations Security Council created
the ICTY as an act, or so the Security Council Resolution claimed, under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 12 But the Security Council has
never decided that there has been a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression" in the former Yugoslavia required under Article
39 of Chapter VII of the Charter to trigger the use of Chapter VII. 1 3 This
situation is not unique to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, but repeti-
tion does not make law unless coupled with an opinio juris, a conviction
that the act is law-declaring or law-making. 1 4
10. GFA, supra note 1, at 76-80, 89-187.
11. The witnesses are the representatives of the European Special Negotiator, the
French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. See id.
12. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 1 6, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/
25704 (May 3, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/
s25704index.htm ("[T]he Council decided, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and
all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should comply with the provisions of that
resolution, failing which the Council would need to take further measures under the
Charter.").
13. U.N. Charter art. 39.
14. There is much debate about the proper meaning of "opiniojuris" in this context.
I have used a minimal interpretation of the Latin words and do not mean to exclude any
other meanings appropriate to particular circumstances.
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This leaves us in a rather peculiar position. Szasz himself points out
that the precise legal relationship between these several agreements and the
constitution, which are all coequal annexes to the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) is not entirely
clear.' 5 Among many other things, Article I of the GFA provides that "[tihe
Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set
forth in the United Nations Charter" but does not set out what those prin-
ciples might be.1 6 Surely the authors of Article I do not mean the text of
the Charter itself; the sovereign equality of the parties to the GFA is
explicit, thus incorporating Article 2.1 of the Charter, but without the pro-
vision of Article 1.2 that requires states to "respect" the "principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples." 17
It should also be borne in mind that the parties to the GFA are not
members of the United Nations; indeed, the representatives of the former
Yugoslavia in the General Assembly of that organization were not present
in Dayton. Instead the GFA is signed by The Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the Republic of Croatia, the FRY (presumably the Serbian entity),
the European Union, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. 18 Annex I-A, dealing
with military measures, was signed by the Republika Srpska and not by
anybody representing the FRY, which appears as endorsing the Annex, but
not being a party to it.19 The Introductory Note by Paul C. Szasz calls the
GFA "an extremely complex instrument" and the "center-piece of an even
more complicated and extensive set of arrangements involving numerous
international organizations and some individual states."'20 Rather than
attempt to simplify it, which is patently impossible without some distor-
tion, it seems best to point out that each organization and party had its
own agenda, and that the final agreement and its annexes represents com-
promises and a witnessing by people not directly involved in anything that
was decided at Dayton other than lending it the importance of their
presence!
It seems important to point out, however, that nothing in the Dayton
Accords and its Annexes created an international criminal tribunal. That
was done, instead, by the United Nations Security Council. The new con-
stitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina does, however, contain an annex which
lists fifteen human rights agreements to be applied in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. 2 ' The Republika Srpska and Croatia seem to be envisaged in the
Dayton documents as part of the new entity. The new constitution for Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is approved by the representative of that entity, but
15. See GFA, supra note 1, at 80.
16. See id. art. I.
17. U.N. Charter arts. 1.2, 2.1.
18. See GFA, supra note 1, at 90 (art. XI).
19. Id. Annex 1-A, at 91.
20. Id. at 77.
21. Id. at 126.
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not signed by anybody else; its relationship to the other parties to the GFA
remains unclear, while such questions as who has the authority to amend
the constitution, remain unresolved (different people might make different
interpretations of parts of the constitution, and some might even find
authority to amend the constitution in general language). But it seems
clear that there is nothing to specify which of the fifteen agreements should
be implemented directly by any Bosnia-Herzegovina tribunals, or how.
2 2
Nor is there anything in the GFA to indicate in which order (legal, moral,
political, economic or other) those rights belong. Annex 6, which relates
solely to human rights provides some clues, but precisely what is meant in
its Article I by "life" or "torture" or "liberty" (to name only a few) remains
unclear. Interpretation and enforcement are left to a Commission on
Human Rights and a Human Rights Chamber (apparently a court) com-
posed of fourteen members. They are to be appointed by the presidency of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but how those appointments are to be freed of politi-
cal manipulation, remains unclear.
It may be concluded that the legal situation regarding both Hussein
and Milogevit is extremely unclear; that different lawyers may take differ-
ent positions as to the meaning of the legal documents; that there are
doubts with regard to political, moral, and other meanings as well. The
best course seems to be to hand Hussein over to the Iraqi authorities (who-
ever they may be) for disposition, and to hope that Milogevit dies before
his trial ends. Neither hope seems terribly far fetched; certainly not as
farfetched as the wish of many international lawyers that there was a cer-
tainty to the law and that it supported their particular version of morality.
22. Some of those treaties provide only precatory language and do not represent any
agreement as to current action. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. It is interesting
to note also that the list of applicable treaties appended to the Annex dealing with
human rights has sixteen rather than fifteen treaties in it. The additional treaty is the
1950 European Convention for the Protection is Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, and the Protocols thereto. Why this treaty is not in the list of fifteen remains
something of a mystery to be resolved by people who were at the Conference in Dayton,
New York, Paris or Rome.
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